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The  multimarket  perspective  identifies  potential  entrants  as  existing  firms  in  related  markets. 
The  paper  uses  this  new  framework  to  analyze  entry  strategies  and  entry  deterrence.  Successful 
entry-permitting  and  entry-deterring  strategies  require  understanding  of  the  feedbacks  from  the 
entry  market  to  the  home  market  and  vice  versa.  The  multimarket  perspective  integrates 
literature  on  industrial  organization  and  strategic  management. 
1.  Introduction 
Potential  entry  is  a  challenge  strategic  management  (SM)  as  this  topic 
raises  issues  such  as  the  identification  potential  entrants,  selection  of 
entry  markets  and  the  scale  of  entry.  SM  theory  recognizes  the  key 
importance  of  potential  (1980)].  This  is  an  area  where 
industrial  organization  [Gilbert 
Yet  it  can  be  argued  that  the  mainstream  of  IO  centers  on  entry  by 
new  firms  [Kottke  (1962,  p.  231.  If,  potential  entrants  existing 
firms,  their  home  market  can  be  of  crucial  importance  to  their  entry 
strategies. 
framework  that  integrates  the 
pieces  of  literature. 
markets)  rivals  are  able  to 
(relatively  quickly)  overcome  which  are  unsurmountable 
markets)  entrants. 
Multimarket  competition  introduces  elements  into  choice. 
This  paper  illustrates  framework  of  multimarket 
competition  for  by  reviewing  relevant  literature 
dispersed  contributions  unifying  perspective.  framework  opens  up 
perspectives  relevant  for  making  by  multinational, 
diversified  and/or  integrated  enterprises. 
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competition.  Section  3 presents  empirical  evidence.  Section  4 deals  with  entry 
deterrence  and  entry  strategies.  Section  5 summarizes  the  argument. 
2.  Multimarket  competition 
Porter’s  (1980,  p.  4) famous  schedule  of  ‘Forces  Driving  Industry  Compe- 
tition’  identifies  five  sources  of  (potential)  competition.  His  concept  of 
extended  rivalry  encompasses  rivalry  with  other  incumbent  firms  (‘he’), 
threats  of  substitutes,  potential  entry  and  bargaining  power  of  suppliers  and 
buyers.  Each  incumbent  firm  buys  inputs  in  input  markets  and  sells  output 
in  output  markets.  The  firm’s suppliers  and  buyers  not  only  exert  bargaining 
power,  but  they  are  also  potential  entrants  (‘she’) if they  integrate  forward  or 
backward.  Substitutes  can  be  demand  substitutes,  if  a  technically  different 
product  serves  similar  needs,  or  technical  substitutes,  if  an  existing  supplier 
can  switch  production  from  the  substitute  to  the  incumbent  firm’s  product. 
Thus  the  forces  of  potential  competition  which  an  incumbent  firm  is facing, 
are  related  to  the  constellation  of markets  in which  he  operates. 
The  new  framework  of  multimarket  competition  complements  Porter’s 
argument  by  distinguishing  five key  features  that  drive  rivalry  if firms  meet  in 
multiple  markets:  (1)  focus  of  rivalry;  (2)  resource  economizing  entry;  (3) 
multimarket  spillovers;  (4) one-sided  and  reciprocal  entry;  and  (5) multimar- 
ket  collusion.  Specific  sources  of  inspiration  are  the  literature  on  diversifi- 
cation,  integration,  multiproduct  firms,  multinational  enterprise,  interbrand 
competition,  transaction  costs  and  international  trade. 
(1)  Focus  of Rivalry.  Competition  can  be  associated  with  three  categories  of 
games  which  are  characterized  by  the  focus  of  rivalry  that  dominates 
competition.  First,  the  incumbents  against  incumbents  game  is studied  in the 
well-established  theories  of  (im)perfect  competition  without  (free)  entry 
[Shapiro  (1989)]:  Only  internal  market  conditions  determine  competition. 
Actual  rivalry  drives  competition.  Second,  the  entry  deterrence  literature 
focuses  on  the  incumbents  against  entrants  game  [Gilbert  (1989)]:  External 
conditions  dominate  over  internal  competition.  Potential  rivalry  rules  compe- 
tition.  The  entrants  against  entrants  game  is explored  only  sporadically  mti 
(1989)]:  Multiple  potential  entrants  have  to  coordinate  (implicitly  or  expli- 
citly)  simultaneous  entry  decisions.  Entry  rivalry  may  invalidate  the  force  of 
potential  competition. 
(2)  Resource  Economizing  Entry.  Inside  entrants  can  economize  on 
resources.  An inside  entrant  can  divert  resources  from  home  to  entry  market, 
which,  on  the  one  hand,  economizes  on  entry  cost  but  gives  an  (opportunity) 
cost  of entry  on  the  other.  Economized  entry  cost  follows  from  using  (excess) 
resources  in  order  to  supply  an  entry  market.  Entry  is associated  with  either 
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substitute,  or  transport  cost  in  exporting,  if the  product  is  transferred  from 
the  home  base  to  another  region  or  country.  Entry  is easy  if the  entry  costs 
are  low  [Calem  (1988,  p.  171)].  If  firms  have  to  operate  at  full  capacity  in 
order  to  satisfy  demand  in the  home  market,  entry  gives  an  opportunity  cost 
in  the  sense  of  home  market  profit  foregone  by  withdrawing  capacity  from 
the  home  market  [Bulow  et  al. (1985)].  The  entry  opportunity  cost  is zero  if 
excess  resources  are  employed  [Cairns  and  Mahabir  (1988)j  or  if  the 
resources  have  a  public  good  character.  Intangible  assets  (such  as  knowhow, 
consumer  goodwill  and  management  skills)  have  this  characteristic  [Teece 
(1980,  1982)]. 
(3)  Multimarket  Spillovers.  Inside  firms  can  exploit  multimarket  spillovers  - 
or  industry  drivers  [for  example,  Yip  (1989)].  Multimarket  spillovers  are 
defined  as externalities  between  two  or  more  markets:  That  is, the  payoffs  in 
market  A have  an  impact  on  the  payoffs  in  market  B and  vice  versa.  Bulow 
et  al.  (1985)  distinguish  supply  from  demand  spillovers.  The  former  include 
joint  (dis)economies  of scale  or  scope.  Operating  in  two  or  more  markets  has 
an  impact  on  the  cost  of  production  and  selling.  Vertical  integration 
(dis)advantages  are  a  third  example  [Brunner  (1961)j.  Multimarket  demand 
spillovers  cover  goodwill  in  the  home  market  which  carries  over  to  the  entry 
market  [Margolis  (1989)].  The  strategy  of  firms  in  market  A  influences  the 
scale  of  demand  in  market  B  (and  vice  versa).  Caves  (1982)  summarizes 
spillovers  in  the  context  of  multinational  enterprise,  whereas  Teece  (1982) 
lists  multimarket  externalities  which  diversified  firms  can  exploit.  A  key 
argument  in  this  literature  is that  (excess)  fungible  but  intangible  assets  can 
be  exploited  by  multimarket  operation.  The  key  point  is  that  positive 
(negative)  multimarket  spillovers,  as  opposed  to  economized  entry  cost, 
increase  (decrease)  the  overall  profit  of  the  entrant  beyond  (below)  the  entry 
profit  per  se [Porter  (1980, p. 349)]. 
(4)  One-Sided  and  Reciprocal  Entry.  Calem  (1988)  explicitly  offers  two 
economic  rationales  for  one-sided  entry.  First,  the  in~um~nt  lirm’s  entry 
cost  is  sufficiently  large  to  trigger  his  decision  to  refrain  from  entering  the 
potential  entrant’s  market  (Calem  (1988,  p.  175)].  Second,  legal  or  regulatory 
barriers  exist  which  prevent  incumbent  firms  from  being  potential  entrant 
into  the  rival’s  market  [Calem  (1988,  p.  182)].  However,  one-sided  entry  is 
far  from  the  only  plausible  case  [Venables  (1990)].  Inside  firms  can  exert  a 
~ec~~~ocu~  edify  threat  [Porter  (1980), and  Calem  (1988)].  Porter  (1980, p. 90) 
summarizes  the  strategic  implications  by  arguing  that  ‘multiple  markets 
provide  a way  in  which  one  firm  can  reward  another  for  not  attacking  it,  or 
conversely,  provide  a  way  of  disciplining  a  renegade.’  Three  examples 
illustrate  reciprocal  entry  (threats).  First,  incumbent  firms  in the  entry  market 
may  decide  to  retaliate  in  the  entrant’s  home  market  [Calem  (1988)].  This 
strategy  of  mounter-attack  is  a  parry  to  the  potential  entrant’s  entry  attack 
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which  anticipate  the  potential  rivals’ entry  move:  Counter-competition  entails 
actions  (for  example,  entry  into  the  potential  entrants’  home  market)  that 
force  the  potential  entrant  to  tie  resources  to  her  home  market.  Third, 
hostage  or  foothold  strategies  can  be  employed  so  as  to  keep  potental 
entrants  in  check  [Caves  (1982)].  A foothold  in  the  potential  entrants’  home 
market  signals  the  ability  to  immediately  respond  to  the  potential  entrants’ 
entry  strategy  by  retaliation  in  her  home  market  [Karnani  and  Wernerfelt 
(1985)]. 
(5)  Multimarket  Cohsion.  Multimarket  contact  among  inside  firms  facili- 
tates  multimarket  collusion  [Bernheim  and  Whinston  (1990)].  The  outcome 
of  multimarket  competition  (after,  for  example,  a  series  of  entry  and 
reciprocal  entry  moves)  may  well  be  a  reduction  in  competition  [Caves 
(1982)].  Edwards  (1955)  proposed  the  hypothesis  that  firms  meeting  in 
several  markets  recognize  their  interdependence  and  therefore  may  decide  to 
tune  down  competition.  Companies  with  multimarket  encounters  are  inclined 
to  facilitate  collusion  [Feinberg  (1985)],  since  the  payoff  of  the  cooperative 
outcome  exceeds  the  competitive  profit  [Kantarelis  and  Veendorp  (1988)]. 
This  phenomenon  is  also  recognized  in  the  literature  on  international  trade 
[Jacquemin  (1989)].  For  example,  reciprocal  dumping  is  the  worst  of  both 
worlds  (or,  to  be  precise,  four  worlds  in  a  Prisoners’  Dilemma):  If  both 
parties  agree  upon  refraining  from  dumping,  joint  profit  is maximized  [Pinto 
(1986)]. 
Current  evidence 
The  framework  identifies  live  forces  of  multimarket  competition.  The  key 
point  is  that  the  entry  threat  from  related  (and  thus  existing)  firms  differs 
qualitatively  from  new  firm  entry.  Empirical  evidence  supports  this  view. 
Existing  firms  tend  to  enter  at  a  much  larger  scale  than  new  firms  [Hause 
and  Du  Rietz  (1984,  p.  746)]  and  to  encroach  on  the  market  share  of  the 
leading  incumbent  firms  [Berry  (1974-5,  p.  202)].  Existing  firms  in  related 
markets  seem  to  have  a  higher  speed  of  entry  than  unrelated  firms  with  few 
related  skills  and  assets  [Lambkin  (1988,  p.  131)].  Moreover,  existing 
(diversifying)  firm  entry  does  not  seem  to  be  responsive  to  barriers  to  entry, 
while  the  opposite  holds  for  new  (or  small)  firm  entry  [Gorecki  (1975,  p. 
144)]. 
The  argument  underlying  these  findings  is that  a  successful  entry  strategy 
may  build  upon  the  entrant’s  home  market.  If  positive  spillovers  exist 
between  related  markets,  an  efficiency  motive  makes  firms  enter  all  of  these 
markets.  If they  do  so, they  tend  to  develop  high  multimarket  contact.  Scott 
(1982)  presents  a  test  of  the  hypothesis  that  multimarket  contact  is too  high 
to  be  random.  His  sample  contains  437  of  the  1000  largest  U.S.  manufac- 
turers  in  1974. He  concludes  that  multimarket  contact  far  exceeds  the  level 
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spillovers  (or  multimarket  economies,  in his words)  to  firm’s decision  making. 
By  way  of  illustration  current  evidence  on  entry  and  collusion  in  a  set  of 
related  markets  is collected  below.  Three  topics  pass  under  review:  (1)  one- 
sided  entry;  (2) reciprocal  entry;  and  (3) multimarket  collusion. 
(1)  One-Sided  Entry.  Kotte  (1962,  p.  43)  observes  that  ‘food  distributors’ 
entry  into  the  bread  industry  illustrate  the  mixed  results  of  “countervailing 
power”.  (. . .) where  food  chains  have  established  their  own  bakeries  they  may 
be  temped  to  go  a  step  further,  selling  bread  below  cost  and  recouping  on 
other  merchandise.  (. . .)  The  typical  retailer  probably  is  persuaded  that  the 
leaders  attract  a  good  deal  of  extra  business  in  other  products.  (.. .)  [This] 
creates  an  impossible  situation  for  non-integrated  bakers’.  This  is an  example 
of one-sided  entry:  The  chain  food  store  enters  the  bread  market,  while  non- 
integrated  bakeries  do  not  enter  the  non-bread  food  market,  Entry  deterrence 
is likely  to  fail  against  a  combination  of  positive  multimarket  spillovers  and 
one-sided  entry. 
Multinational  enterprises  (MNEs),  for  example  Japanese  firms,  often 
engage  in  one-sided  entry  from  a  protected  home  market.  This  endows  them 
with  a competitive  advantage:  ‘In the  case  where  the  U.S. market  is open  and 
a large  foreign  market  is closed,  foreign  competitors  would  be able  to  achieve 
more  efficient  scale  via  volume  in  the  domestic  and  overseas  sales,  while 
domestic  competitors  would  be  squeezed  into  a  portion  of  the  domestic 
market.  (. . .) Under  these  economic  conditions  -  large  scale  learning  -access 
to  foreign  markets  and  control  over  the  home  market  would  become  a firm’s 
top  priority’  [Yoffie  and  Milner  (1989,  p.  113)].  The  foreign  MNE  benefits 
from  a  multimarket  supply  spillover  between  the  entry  and  her  (protected) 
home  market.  She  recovers  fixed  costs  of  R&D  and  the  like  in  her  home 
market.  This  asymmetry  affects  pricing  in  the  entry  market  as  the  foreign 
MNE  prices  in  order  to  recover  marginal  production  and  transportation 
costs,  whereas  the  domestic  producers  price  in order  to  recover  R&D  and  all 
other  fixed  expenses  as well. 
Domestic  suppliers  perceive  the  MNEs’  pricing  policy  as dumping.  That  is, 
‘industries  in Japan  and  other  PBCs  (i.e., Pacific  Basin  Countries)  often  enjoy 
very  supportive  relationships  with  their  governments.  Frequently  this 
includes  protection  against  imports  into  their  domestic  markets.  This  permits 
the  PBCs  to  subsidize  exports  to  other  markets  with  profits  from  domestic 
sales.  Zenith  complained  to  the  U.S.  Trade  Commission  that  in  1976  the 
least-expensive  19-inch  color  television  set  available  in  Japan  was  priced  at 
the  equivalent  of $700, but  the  same  and  comparable  sets were  selling for  less 
than  $350 in  the  United  States.  Domestic  TV  set  makers  could  not  retaliate 
by  lowering  prices,  since  their  entire  domestic  sales  would  be  affected  in  a 
price  war.  But  Pacific  Basin  competitors  could  maintain  lower  prices  on  the 
export  portion  of  their  sales  knowing  that  their  profitable  home  market  was 278  A.  van Witteloostuijn  and M.  van Wegberg, Multimarket  competition 
protected’  [Willard  and  Savara  (1988,  p.  70)].  In  reported  cases,  U.S.  firms 
affected  seek  a  strategic  trade  policy  from  the  U.S.  government  to  enforce 
reciprocal  access  to  the  Japanese  market  [Yoffie  and  Milner  (1989,  pp.  118, 
124)]. 
(2)  Reciprocal  Entry.  Global  competition  shows  many  examples  of  multi- 
market  competition  and  entry  by  existing  (foreign)  firms.  For  example,  an 
entry  motive  for  U.S.  firms  in  Japan  is  to  tap  local  resources  and  skills. 
Production  by  the  Japanese  affiliate  is  then  exported  back  into  the  U.S. 
[Encarnation  (1987,  pp.  38-39)].  By  using  Japan  as  an  export  platform  the 
U.S.  firm  exploits  a  multimarket  supply  spillover  from  the  Japanese  entry 
market  to  her  home  market.  Watson  (1982,  p.  40)  suggests  another  entry 
motive.  Firms  may  preempt  future  entrants  by  counter-competition.  That  is, 
the  ‘pursuit  of  a  foreign  competitor’s  domestic  markets  can  help  protect  the 
threatened  company’s  own  home  market  sales’. 
Entry  by  a multinational  enterprise  by  setting  up  a local  subsidiary  can  be 
part  of  a  wider  strategy  involving  competition  with  another  MNE  in  other 
markets  [Caves  (1982, pp.  106-107)].  That  is to  say,  reciprocal  entry  requires 
a  local  subsidiary.  Or,  a  ‘subsidiary  on  the  invader’s  turf  establishes  both  a 
means  of retaliation  and  a hostage  that  can  be  staked  out  in  any  subsequent 
understanding  between  the  two  parents’  [Caves  (1982,  p.  107)].  Case  studies 
by  Karnani  and  Wernerfelt  (1985)  show  that  firms  do  indeed  use  a  foreign 
subsidiary  for  a  reciprocal  response.  Particularly  illustrative  are  the  tights 
between  Goodyear  and  Michelin  in  the  tyre  market,  Maxwell  House  and 
Proctor  and  Gamble  in  the  roasted  coffee  industry  and  BIC  and  Gillette  in 
the  markets  for  pens  and  razors. 
The  general  pattern  for  competition  between  U.S.  and  E.C.  firms  may  run 
in  the  opposite  direction,  as  Graham  (1978)  suggests.  Graham  reports  a 
study  of  direct  investments  by  U.S.  firms  in  Europe  and  vice  versa.  His 
finding  is  that  an  increase  in  the  number  of  U.S.  subsidiaries  in  Europe  is 
typically  followed,  after  a  lag,  by  an  increase  of  European  subsidiaries  in  the 
U.S.  The  lag  is  four  years  for  industries  such  as  chemicals,  refineries  and 
instruments.  Graham  suggests  that  this  fact  represents  rivalry:  European 
firms  install  subsidiaries  as  a  response  to  previous  U.S.  moves.  So,  he 
suggests  that  reciprocal  entry  explains  this  pattern. 
(3)  Multimarket  Collusion.  The  outcome  of  a  sequence  of  entry  and 
reciprocal  entry  moves  may  well  be  a  reduction  in  competition.  Caves 
illustrates  this  by  the  example  that  ‘at the  extreme,  markets  can  wind  up  less 
competitive  after  the  peace  treaty  is  signed  than  they  were  before  the  initial 
aggressive  move.  An  example  of  this  adverse  development  was  the  British 
tobacco  market  after  the  entry  of American  Tobacco  in  1901. Induced  by  the 
British  tariff  structure,  American  purchased  a  leading  British  producer.  That 
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After  a  year  of  duopolisti~  rivalry,  a  peace  treaty  gave  Imperial  a  monopoly 
of the  British  and  Irish  markets,  and  American  got  a  guarantee  that  Imperial 
would  not  sell  in  the  United  States  or  its  dependencies.  British-American 
Tobacco  was  organized  as  a joint  venture  to  handle  business  in  the  rest  of 
the  world’  [Caves  (1982, pp.  104105)]. 
Market  sharing  agreements,  such  as  by  American  and  Imperial  Tobacco, 
are  an  example  of  mult~market  coll~io~.  Edwards  (1955)  proposed  the 
hypothesis  that  ‘when  sellers  meet  in several  markets,  their  recognition  of  the 
interdependence  of their  operations  may  blunt  the  vigor  of their  competition 
with  each  other’  [Scott  (1982,  p.  369)].  Feinberg  (1985)  specifies  Edwards’ 
hypothesis  by  arguing  that  ‘companies  meeting  rivals  in  more  than  one 
market  will  be  able  to  facilitate  collusion  in  one  or  all  of  those  markets’ 
[Feinberg  (1985, p. 238)]. 
Multimarket  contact  research  seeks  to  verify  this  hypothesis  [Heggestad 
and  Rhoades  (1978)  and  Feinberg  (1985)].  As one  consequence  of  multimar- 
ket  contact,  firms  (in  the  case  below  Japanese  semiconductor  suppliers)  may 
develop  a  follow-the-leader  strategy:  ‘Japanese  companies,  unlike  most  of 
their  American  counterparts,  competed  in  other  consumer  and  industrial 
product  areas  as  well  as  in  semiconductors.  Such  diversi~cation  heightened 
pressures  for  imitative  behavior  at  home  and  abroad.  Sequential  foreign 
investment  was one  response’  [Encarnation  (1987, p.  32)]. 
4.  Entry strategies and entry deterrence 
Key  strategies  concern  entry  deterrence  and  actual  entry.  The  first  strategy 
is  associated  with  signaling  unprofitable  entry  opportunities,  whereas  the 
second  policy  goes  hand  in hand  with  the  selection  of entry  markets.  The  five 
features  of  multimarket  competition  indicate  factors  that  can  facilitate  both 
strategies.  The  imperatives  are  summarized  in table  1. 
Future  research  can  be  directed  at  identifying  the  ways  by  which  firms 
may  recognize  and  implement  these  strategies.  By  way  of  illustration  two 
issues  which  are  related  to  multimarket  strategies  are  discussed  briefly:  (1) 
protect  the  home  market  at  least  during  the  entry  process;  and  (2) select  an 
entry  market. 
(1)  Home  Market  Protection.  If  a  firm  enters  a  second  market,  she  may 
reduce  her  barriers  to  exit  from  the  first.  This  is  a  strategic  weakness,  as 
Eaton  and  Lipsey  (1980, p. 728) have  shown.  Entry  into  another  market  may 
involve  partial  exit,  i.e.,  a  reallocation  of  resources  away  from  the  home 
towards  the  entry  market.  Thus  entry  goes  along  with  a  reduction  of  exit 
barriers.  This  may  invite  entry  into  her  own  home  market  for  two  reasons. 
First,  partial  exit  reduces  the  size  of  her  commitment  to  the  home  market 
and  raises  expected  entry  profits  in  her  home  market.  Second,  it  raises  the 
expectation  that  she  will  react  upon  entry  by  accommodation.  Since  entry 280  A. van Witteloostuijn  and M.  van Wegberg, Multimarket  competition 
Table  1 
Entry  deterrence  and  market  selection. 
Key  element 
1.  Focus  of rivalry 
2.  Resource  econo- 
mizing  entry 
3.  Multimarket 
spillovers 
4.  Reciprocal  entry 
5.  Multimarket 
collusion 
Deter  entry  by  Select  a market 
focusing  on  incumbents 
against  entrants  game 
raising  strategic  entry 
barriers  that  impede  economizing 
on  entry  cost 
stimulating  negative 
spillovers  with  potential 
entry  markets 
signaling  a credible 
reciprocal  entry  threat 
showing  unwillingness  to 
collude  after  entry 
which  does  not  suffer from 
predominant  actual  rivalry  which 
drives  profit  down 
which  permits  to  economize  on 
entry  cost 
where  positive  multimarket 
spillovers  are  eminent 
where  incumbents  fail to  exert  a 
credible  reciprocal  entry  threat 
where  incumbents  are  willing  to 
collude 
reduces  home  market  profits,  she  may  shift  even  more  resources  into  her 
entry  market,  which  implies  that  she  accommodates  entry  by  (partial)  exit 
[Calem  (1988,  p.  172)].  This  scenario  can  be  avoided  by  selecting  an  entry 
market,  if available,  which  increases  the  exit  barrier  from  her  home  market.  If 
an  entry  market  induces  significant  positive  spillovers  to  the  home  market, 
entry  can  raise  the  commitment  to  the  home  market. 
(2)  Entry  Market  Selection.  With  multiple  entry  markets  two  criteria  can  be 
indicated  which  can  guide  selection  of  a  specific  market.  First,  the  potential 
entrant  should  take  into  account  that  her  entry  changes  the  incumbent  firm’s 
opportunity  cost  of entry.  Reciprocal  entry  may  occur.  The  incumbent  firm’s 
response  is  most  favorable  if  he  faces  an  entry  barrier  to  the  potential 
entrant’s  home  market,  yet  low  exit  barriers  to  other  markets.  Second,  entry 
barriers  and  multimarket  spillovers  are  critical.  Barriers  to  entry  can  lose 
significance  for  potential  entrants  who  are  incumbent  elsewhere.  Economies 
of  scale,  for  instance,  are  not  a  barrier  if  potential  entrants  have  already 
realized  their  economies  in  a  home  market  [Brunner  (1961)  and  Yip  (1982)]. 
Economies  of  scale  or  scope  even  invite  entry  if potential  entrants  exceed  in 
size  or  scope  the  incumbent  firms  in  a  market.  Similar  arguments  hold  for 
other  barriers:  Product  differentiation  and  absolute  cost  advantages.  Thus 
multimarket  spillovers  can  help  to  overcome  entry  barriers.  Moreover,  they 
increase  the  profitability  of  entry  without  undermining  the  commitment  to 
the  home  market. 
5.  Appraisal 
Multimarket  modeling  offers  a  framework  for  analyzing  entry  strategies A.  van  Witteloostuijn  and  M.  van  Wegberg,  Multimarket  competition  281 
and  what  Yip  (1982)  calls  ‘gateways  to  entry’:  Opportunities  for  potential 
entry.  It  also  explores  the  strategic  implications  of  transferring  the  battle- 
ground  from  the  incumbent  firm’s  home  market  to  the  potential  entrant’s 
home  market.  So,  the  multimarket  framework  identifies  entry  deterrence 
instruments  which  incumbent  firms  can  use  if  they  face  a  threat  of  existing 
firm  entry.  These  insights  gain  relevance  in  the  context  of  increasing  global 
competition. 
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